I discuss two arguments against the view that reasons are propositions. I consider responses to each argument, including recent responses due to Mark Schroeder, and suggest further responses of my own. In each case, the discussion proceeds by comparing reasons to answers and goals.
Introduction
We believe and act based on reasons all the time. But what kinds of things are these reasons? The question is interesting enough in itself. Moreover our answer to this ontological question can affect how we answer various normative questions about what makes reasons good or bad, and whether actions or beliefs based on them are justified, rational, proper, and the like. 1 This paper evaluates two arguments against the view that reasons are prop ositions, and suggests responses. I call the view that reasons are proposi tions abstractionism. Abstractionism's main rival is statism, which says that reasons are mental states of the subject. I am partial to statism, and have argued extensively for it elsewhere, so this paper might well be subtitled 'Advice to My Abstractionist Friends.' At one time I thought that each of the arguments discussed below provided evidence against abstractionism, but further reflection convinced me that they could ultimately be effectively resisted, and the present paper embodies my research in this regard. Given my preference for statism, I would be happy if what I say here in defense of abstractionism were proven wrong.
We can appreciate the difference between statism and abstractionism by considering what they imply about specific cases.
2 Take a typical case of perceptual belief. You see that a chipmunk is dashing under a bush, and this prompts you to believe that a chipmunk is dashing under a bush. What is the basis of this belief? The statist says it is your perception that a chip munk is dashing under a bush. The abstractionist says it is the proposition <a chipmunk is dashing under a bush>. (I use angle brackets to name prop ositions.) Or take a typical inferential belief. Suppose Sarah Palin believes that Barack Obama wants to set up "death panels," and that if he wants to set up death panels, then he is a fiend. This prompts her to infer that Obama is a fiend. What is the basis of this inferential judgment? The statist says it is Palin's belief that Obama wants to set up death panels, along with her belief that if he wants to set up death panels, then he is a fiend. The abstrac tionist says it is <Obama wants to set up death panels> along with <if Obama wants to set up death panels, then he is a fiend>. Generally speak ing, whenever the statist identifies the reason as mental state M with the content <Q>, the abstractionist will instead identify it as <Q>.
Let in favor of a belief or action. Rather, as I have said, they are theories of the reasons our beliefs are based on, or as it is sometimes put in the literature, "motivating reasons." 3 Third, they are not general theories of the reasons why we believe things. When we believe something for a reason, then of course that reason helps explain our belief. But many things help explain our belief which are not among our reasons for holding the belief. For instance if Todd Palin deceived Sarah Palin into believing that Obama wants to set up death panels, it does not follow that Todd's deception is among Sarah's reasons for holding that belief, even though his deception helps explain why she holds it. Finally, despite the simplicity of the cases I used to illustrate the difference between abstractionism and statism, both theories can accommodate cases where a belief is based on multiple rea sons or multiple lines of reasoning.
The next two sections each focus on one argument against abstraction ism. Each argument shares the same basic form. If either argument were to succeed, it would be a considerable meta physical discovery with potentially serious implications for ethics and epistemology.
The Problem of Possession
The first argument is: Possessionless A1. You can have reasons. A2. You can't have propositions. C. So reasons aren't propositions.
A1 is obviously true.
5 What about A2? It can seem absurd to say that some one has a proposition, and so it can easily seem that the argument succeeds. I would now like to consider a couple ways of resisting the argument, one of which I find wanting, the other of which I find more promising.
First, abstractionists might argue that we do not literally have the rea sons our beliefs and actions are based on, but instead "have" them in some metaphorical sense in which it is plausible that we can "have" propositions. 6 This strategy will not convince unless it is supported by some actual linguis tic data suggesting that we are dealing with nonliteral talk. But I doubt such data is forthcoming. Indeed the data suggest that 'have' in 'have a rea son' is used literally.
Consider these sentences:
1. Maria has one bat she strikes baseballs with. 2. Maria has one bat she feeds live crickets to. 3. Maria has one bat she strikes baseballs with and one she feeds live crickets to.
1 and 2 both sound fine. But 3 strikes us as odd because 'one bat' refers to a baseball bat, whereas 'one' then refers to a small flying mammal. 1 and 2 cannot properly reduce and conjoin to form 3. This shows that 'bat' is not used synonymously in 1 and 2. 7 Consider also these sentences:
4. Maria swam across a river. 5. Maria cried a river. 6. Maria swam across a river, and cried another.
4 and 5 each sound fine on their own, but cannot properly reduce and con join to form 6, because 'river' is used metaphorically or idiomatically in 5 but not 4. Now consider these sentences:
7. Mario has a business. 8. Mario has several reasons for believing his business will flourish. 9. Mario has a business and several reasons for believing it will flourish. 7 and 8 reduce and conjoin to form 9. 9 sounds just fine, indicating that 'has' has a literal meaning either in both 7 and 8, or in neither. Since it has a lit eral meaning in 7, it does in 8 too.
Second, abstractionists might argue, as Mark Schroeder has, that by endorsing Possessionless, we succumb to a tempting mistake due to an ambiguity of 'have.'
8 Sometimes 'X has Y' means 'X possesses Y' . But often times 'X has Y' means 'X stands in salient relation R to Y' (or vice versa). For example, 'I have a father' means that someone stands in the father relation to me. It does not mean that I possess a father.
9 And of course we can stand in relations to propositions. So if we can understand 'I have a reason' to mean that a proposition stands in the reason relation to me, then we can deny A2.
It is true that 'have' generally behaves this way, and that we can stand in relations to propositions. But it is not clear that this is enough to enable a convincing response to the argument. I will first explain why this response, as it stands, might fail to convince. Then I will explain why I believe that something in the neighborhood fares better.
We can contrive contexts where it sounds okay to say 'I have the proposi tion <Sarah published a book>.' Suppose you and I are playing a strange game. The game is to see who can think about their assigned proposition for the longest time. You get assigned <Barack published a book> and I get assigned <Sarah published a book>. A third party enters and asks, 'Who's supposed to be thinking about Sarah?' I respond, 'I am. I have the proposi tion <Sarah published a book>.' This sounds fine. Now given that we can generate this effect in the context of our strange game, if Schroeder's response to Possessionless were correct, then we should expect it to sound okay to say 'I have the proposition <Sarah published a book>' when it is salient that this proposition is my reason for believing something. But that does not happen. Consider: I say, 'Sarah published something.' Everyone asks what my reason is for thinking this. I respond, 'Sarah published a book.' Everyone believes me. It still sounds ridiculous for me to say, 'So I have the proposition <Sarah published a book>.' And it would likewise sound ridicu lous for others to say of me, 'He has the proposition <Sarah published a book>.' Consider a different case. Barack and Joe both believe that Sarah published something. We ask them what their reasons are for thinking this. Barack says, 'Sarah published a book;' Joe says, 'Sarah published a journal article. ' We all believe that they are being sincere. Now someone asks, 'So which of these two gentleman has the proposition <Sarah published a book>?' The question is unintelligible. But it would not be unintelligible if the abstractionist proposal currently under consideration were true.
Let me put the worry slightly differently. Even when the reason relation is salient -because, say, we have just been asked what our reason is for believing Sarah published something, and we respond by saying 'She pub lished a book' -it still sounds awful to say 'I have the proposition <Sarah published a book>. ' That is one basis for being dissatisfied with Schroeder's response. But lurking in the neighborhood is a related, complementary, and perhaps more effective response.
The alternative response features the locution 'have, as an F.' We can say things like 'I have, as my answer, the number 2' and 'I have, as my main goal, a cure for malaria.' Save for special contexts, from those statements we can not infer either 'I have the number 2' or 'I have a cure for malaria.' Likewise, from the statement 'I have, as my reason, the proposition <Sarah published a book>,' we should not expect to be able to conclude 'I have the proposi tion <Sarah published a book>. ' Returning now to Possessionless, we can see that it straightforwardly begs the question, provided that 'have' is understood in a way relevant to the debate over the nature of reasons. In order to ensure that 'have' refers to the relevant relation throughout, we need to read it like so: A1' . You can have, as reasons, reasons. A2' . You can't have, as reasons, propositions. C. So reasons aren't propositions.
But then A2' obviously begs the question. 11 Perhaps we must always say 'I have, as my reason' to hear it as predicating the reason relation. It is an open question how significant this disanalogy is between reasontalk on the one hand, and answertalk or goaltalk on the other.
The Problem of Powerlessness
Here is the second argument.
Powerless
B1. Reasons are causes. B2. Propositions don't cause anything. C. So reasons aren't propositions.
Why accept B1? Because reasons must explain the attitudes based on them, and the best account of reasons' explanatory role is that they are causes, so reasons are causes.
12 Why accept B2? Because propositions are non spatiotemporal objects, and all nonspatiotemporal objects are causally powerless, so propositions are causally powerless.
13 Notice how easily abstractionist can liken talk of having reasons to other respectable 'have'talk, such as hav ing answers or goals.
11
My correspondents are ambivalent on the question.
12
Compare Donald Davidson, 'Actions Reasons and Causes,' reprinted in D. Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), pp. 3-20 (10) . For an extended explanation and defense of the causal theory of reasons, see John Turri, 'Believing for a Reason, ' Erkenntnis 74 (2011), pp. 383-397. 13 Compare Paul Benacerraf's famous challenge to platonism in mathematics, 'Mathematical Truth,' Journal of Philosophy 70 (1973), 661-679. statism accommodates the causal profile of reasons: mental states can cause one another, and reasons just are mental states, so reasons can be causes.
14 Abstractionists might object to the argument for B1. They might dispute the claim that the best account of reasons' explanatory role is that they are causes. It is natural to think that this would require defending an alterna tive account of their explanatory role. But progress on this front has been minimal. 15 However there is an alternative strategy. 16 The strategy is to claim that although it is true that your having the reason must cause your belief, it is not true that the reason itself must cause your belief. It is a subtle distinc tion between a reason causing the belief and your having of the reason causing the belief, and because everyone agrees that you must have a reason in order for your belief to be based on it, the abstractionist can explain why many people have mistakenly thought the causal theory seemed so obvi ously true.
The strategy is interesting, though there is some reason not to be entirely satisfied with it. First, after carefully considering the proposal, I find it implausible that I am making the mistake it attributes to me. I doubt that I would mistake the causal efficacy of having a reason for the efficacy of the reason itself, any more than I would mistake, for example, the causal effi cacy of having a dog for the efficacy of the dog itself. This is especially true in a context where the potential mistake has been explicitly suggested, and we are on alert. Second, the proposal says, 'while it is true that your having the reason must cause your belief, it is not true that the reason itself must cause your belief,' but abstractionism actually entails something much stronger. If abstractionism is true, then not only is it true that reasons need not cause your belief, it is also true that reasons could not possibly cause your belief, or anything else for that matter. This consequence is much more difficult to accept than the relatively modest claim that sometimes reasons explain by virtue of a noncausal relation, which is the most 14 I take it that something like this line of thought helps motivate Davidson's identifica tion of a "primary reason" as the combination of "a belief and an attitude" (later: an "inten tion"), given that Davidson thinks that reasons explain action by causing it; see 'Reasons, Actions, and Causes' , formidable response to B1, and the most popular one in the literature on causal theories of reasons for both action and belief.
17
But I will set aside these worries, since my main concern presently lies elsewhere. I think this new suggestion for responding to B1 could be bol stered by producing analogous cases where the having of X causes Y, but X itself does not. For unless we find such analogs, the strategy will look like special pleading, resting on a radical and unprecedented causal asymmetry between the having of X and X itself. And here I think we might once again profit from comparing reasons to answers and goals.
My having the answer to a question might cause me to win a prize, but the answer itself, <Topeka is the capital of Kansas>, does not. My having the goal of curing malaria might cause me to study parasitology, but the goal itself, to cure malaria, does not. In each of these cases, it seems that my being in a certain state with a certain content -my believing that Topeka is the capital of Kansas, and my aiming to cure malaria -causes the relevant outcomes, even though it is implausible that the abstract representational content of those states could cause anything.
